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Abstract  
Organisations that allow employees to Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) in the workplace trade off the 
convenience of allowing employees to use their own device against higher risks to the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of organisational information assets. While BYOD is a well-defined and 
accepted trend in some organisations, there is little research on how policies can address the 
information security risks posed by BYOD. This paper reviews the extant literature and develops a 
comprehensive list of information security risks that are associated with allowing BYOD in 
organisations. This list is then used to evaluate five BYOD policy documents to determine how 
comprehensively BYOD information security risks are addressed. The outcome of this research shows 
that of the 13 identified BYOD risks, only 8 were adequately addressed by most of the organisations.  
Keywords: BYOD, Information Security Management, Security Risk 
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1 Introduction 
As technology has become more ubiquitous, the use of mobile devices for conducting organisational 
work has increased. In particular, the demand of employees to be able to use their own devices in the 
workplace for carrying out organisational tasks is a driving force behind organisations adopting a 
Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) approach to doing business. In allowing BYOD in the workplace, 
employees can access organisational information assets on employee owned devices (Astani et al. 
2013). This is convenient for users and the organisation. Users can be more productive, accessing 
electronic organisational resources from inside and outside the workplace and organisations can 
reduce the cost of providing electronic devices to their employees (Donaldson et al. 2015; Kang et al. 
2015). However, this convenience introduces challenges for organisations in terms of how to 
implement security practices on devices that are privately owned (Zahadat et al. 2015).  
Donaldson et al. (2015) comment that despite the growth of information security concerns from 
BYOD, organisations cannot stop this trend. Currently, in order to maintain the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of the organisations information assets, international best practices often are 
usually employed (Von Solms and Von Solms 2009). However, specific best practice for establishing a 
BYOD program in organisations is not yet well defined (Zahadat et al. 2015). Subsequently, although 
security experts have identified several BYOD risks that may arise, BYOD risks have not been 
adequately addressed by the Information Systems (IS) community (Tu et al. 2015).  
The purpose of this paper is twofold.  First, it analyses the literature around BYOD and security to 
identify a comprehensive list of security risks particular to BYOD. Second, it carries out an evaluation 
of five BYOD policies to identify those risks that are not being mitigated by those policies. This 
evaluation aims to address the main research question: 
How comprehensively are BYOD information security risks addressed in BYOD 
policy? 
This paper is structured as follows. Background to the area of BYOD and information security is 
presented and the challenges that arise from organisations allowing BYOD are identified. The research 
approach is then described. This is followed by a comprehensive review of literature around BYOD and 
its related security risks which identifies 13 BYOD specific security risks. Finally, an analysis of 5 
BYOD policies is made, the results of this analysis and discusses, and the implications, contributions 
and further research propositions are outlined.  
2 Background 
In this section the definition, organisational benefits and security issues of BYOD are introduced. 
2.1 BYOD Definition 
There are a number of definitions of the concept of BYOD in the literature.  In this paper we adapt the 
definition provided by Gartner (2012) which states that BYOD can potentially include a large variety of 
electronic devices including: workstations, mobile communication devices portable storage media 
(USB memory sticks, memory cards, portable hard drives, floppy disks) and media recorders. From 
this broad BYOD definition, the BYOD scope has been narrowed in this research. The main feature to 
consider in an electronic device like a BYOD is that users are often conducting knowledge work. In 
this study the BYOD scope has been limited to personal devices with the following characteristics: 
 The user can do knowledge work with the device. 
 It must be owned by the individual and not by the organisation. 
 The device is portable. 
 It is capable of installing third party software applications. 
 It can be connected to at least one wireless network interface, a mobile phone network (2G, 3G, 
4G), a local area wireless computer network (Wi-Fi) or a personal area network (Bluetooth). 
2.2 Benefits of Allowing BYOD into Organisations 
Organisations allowing BYOD in the workplace gain a number of benefits. First, employees are more 
likely to do organisational work whilst off site as they can access the same electronic resources from 
almost any location as they can in their workplace (Donaldson et al. 2015). Second, adopting BYOD 
reduces organisational operation costs (Kang et al. 2015). If organisations allow their employees to use 
their personal devices, they eliminate the cost of providing hardware, software and technical 
maintenance (Kang et al. 2015). Additionally, organisations do not need to provide training to users on 
Australasian Conference on Information Systems  Arregui & Maynard 
2016. Woolongong  Mitigating BYOD Information Security Risks 
  3 
using the device as they are already familiar with its functionality (Kang et al. 2015). Third, BYOD 
provides better productivity and efficiency among users (Kang et al. 2015). According to Köffer et al. 
(2015), enterprise tools provided by organisations are often considered "slow and cumbersome." 
Therefore, organisations allowing their employees to use their smartphones and tablets can increase 
their productivity (Kang et al. 2015; Köffer et al. 2015). Additionally, allowing BYOD creates a positive 
change in the working environment because employees don’t feel restricted using organisation’ 
equipment. Indeed, Köffer et al. (2015) claim that BYOD in some cases not only increases productivity, 
but also stimulates innovation among employees, giving more flexibility and can result in an increase 
in employee contentment. 
2.3 BYOD and Information Security 
Despite the benefits of implementing BYOD in organisations, it has also created novel security risks for 
organisations (Webb et al. 2014). Allowing BYOD into the organisation creates potential security 
breaches because users’ devices will have access to the internal network and sensitive organisational 
information (Moreira et al. 2015). Son (2011) suggests that employing personal devices in 
organisations has contributed to over half of information security breaches occurring in organisations, 
as employees often fail to comply with information security procedures. The challenge for 
organisations is to influence the use of personal devices, which are not part of organisational fixed 
assets, to protect organisational information security. Organisations need effective ways to preserve 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of sensitive information accessed or manipulated with the rise 
of personal devices (Ahmad et al. 2006). Cappelli et al. (2012) remark that information security 
incidents can be triggered by former employees, contractors, suppliers and business partners, who 
may have access to sensitive organisational information using personal devices. Information leakage 
may cause substantial damage to the organisation, including financial loss, operational disruption, 
damage to the organisation reputation and damage to the client’s image (Ahmad et al. 2014).  
3 Research methodology 
This paper undertakes a comprehensive literature review to identify BYOD specific security risks.  The 
review searched for literature on BYOD and Mobile Devices related to security, policy, issues, 
challenges and utilised the following search engines: “Science Direct”, “Springer”, “IEEE”, “ProQuest”, 
“Taylor & Francis Group”, and “Google Scholar”. 120 academic articles were selected based on their 
titles and abstracts from this search. Each article was then read to determine their relevance and those 
articles that were not relevant to this research were discarded. This resulted in 50 papers being 
identified that were relevant, which were then analysed using thematic coding as described by Neuman 
(2006). This analysis resulted in the identification of 13 subthemes (or security risks related to BYOD). 
The second part of this research uses the BYOD risks identified to assess 5 organisational BYOD 
policies to determine whether organisations address the risks. Initially we searched for (using Google) 
and identified 27 policies related to mobile devices and BYOD in organisations. From this we read each 
policy and discarded 19 of these as they did not deal with the use of personal devices (rather just 
mobile devices provided by the organisation). This left 8 policies. As this was preliminary research, a 
selection of different organisations types was selected (related to the 8 policies we were able to collect), 
5 in total: Org1 – Non Profit Organisation, Org2 – Health Organisation, Org3 Educational 
Organisation, Org4 Government Organisation, Org5 – Private Organisation.  The remaining 3 policies 
were all in the education sector and were not used in the study (there were similar in form and content 
to the other policies in the education sector). The policies were evaluated against the comprehensive 
list of security risks associated with allowing BYOD into organisations. The analysis was made 
comparing each BYOD policy statement with the risks identified in the literature. If one statement in 
the BYOD policy addresses one of the identified risks, it was concluded that the organisation 
acknowledges and therefore tries to mitigate that risk. Conversely, if none of the policy statements 
addressed a specific risk it was concluded that the organisation does not acknowledge and therefore 
doesn’t mitigate that risk. The analysis did not include how effective the organisation was in mitigating 
BYOD risks. However, it did identify the extent of those risks addressed in the five BYOD policies. 
4 Literature Review Synthesis of Risks Associated with Allowing 
BYOD into Organisations 
Table 1 summarises thirteen BYOD risks from the literature that are associated with allowing BYOD 
into organisations. Additionally, to identify the most significant risks, they have been grouped into 
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three common areas related to BYOD usage: User behaviour, Connectivity risks, Organisational 
management practices.  This section will discuss each risk in turn. 
User Behaviour 
Risk 1: BYOD Device Selection  
Risk 2: BYOD Customisation  
Risk 3: Installation of Malicious Applications 
Risk 4: Insecure Operational Behaviour 
Risk 5: Unauthorised Access  
Risk 6: Exposure of Sensitive Organisational Data  
Risk 7: Lost BYOD Devices 
Risk 8: Data Integrity Loss 
Connectivity 
Risk 9: Exposure in Public Networks  
Risk 10: Local Network Exposure  Risk 11: Exposure in Personal Networks  
Organisational Management Practices 	
Risk 12: BYOD Remote Management  Risk 13: BYOD Training  
Table 1: Synthesis of risks associated with allowing BYOD into the organisation 
4.1 BYOD Risks that Arise from User’s Behaviour 
This section identifies and discusses 8 risks that arise from user’s behaviour. 
4.1.1 Risk 1: BYOD Device Selection  
Users can choose from many BYOD platforms (eg. Apple’s iOS, Android, and Windows Mobile). Each 
platform has a unique security model, with strengths and weaknesses to counter security incidents 
(Gajar et al. 2013). To illustrate this, Android’s open structure is customisable by the user which makes 
it more susceptible to attacks than other mobile systems (Wood 2013). Whereas, Apple’s iOS security 
prevents the use of mobile device management (MDM) because of security restrictions in the operating 
system. The specific selection of a BYOD platform by users can expose the organisation to information 
security incidents, that are not present in other platforms (Armando et al. 2014; Mont 2012). 
Organisations need to evaluate the security risks for each BYOD platform before initiating a BYOD 
program. They should define the benefits and disadvantages of particular platforms and establish 
strategies to counter security incidents that may arise. This information should be conveyed to users. 
4.1.2 Risk 2: BYOD Customisation 
Users can customise some BYOD platforms to alter their “security” features; thereby, exposing the 
organisation to information security incidents (Gest 2013; Kang et al. 2015; Lawrence and Riley 2014).  
"Jailbreaking", "root", and “unlock” are three popular procedures that users may execute on personal 
devices to remove vendors’ configuration restrictions, thereby customising their devices according to 
their requirements. These procedures allow users to install third-party applications unavailable on 
official vendor stores or unlock carrier-locked devices (Lawrence and Riley 2014). Users bringing these 
devices into organisations may affect information security when utilised as BYOD’s. Kang et al. (2015) 
suggests that "jailbreaking" or "root" devices are made more vulnerable to insecure applications 
because they can access device sensors (microphone, camera, etc.) or sensitive information storage in 
the device (contacts, calendars, etc.) without restrictions. Insecure applications on jailbroken devices 
run with administrator privileges with considerable control over device sensors and applications (Kang 
et al. 2015). Subsequently, it is critical for organisations to define whether or not the use of 
"jailbreaking" or "root" devices is permitted as a BYOD. 
4.1.3 Risk 3: Installation of Malicious Applications 
Normally, users customise their devices according to their preferences and needs, using application 
markets, like Apple Store and Google Play, to browse and install applications. Armando et al. (2014) 
suggests that during the application installation process, users grant permissions, like allowing push 
notifications or location-based services, putting aside security considerations because of the benefits 
that will be received (Armando et al. 2014). The security risk arises when applications with different 
levels of trust are installed on the same device (Chin et al. 2011). For example, a free game application 
will be installed on the same device as a highly trusted banking application. The free application may 
be a malicious one that can sniff, modify, or steal inter-application messages and, therefore, 
compromise organisational information security (Ketel and Shumate 2015). Ketel and Shumate (2015) 
claim that users are unable to recognise which applications have malicious functionality. Those 
applications affect the information security of the organisation, generate problems for data privacy, 
and affect organisations and customers’ reputations (Ketel and Shumate 2015). Ketel and Shumate 
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(2014) maintain that it is critical for organisations to control which applications can be installed on 
BYOD in order to protect the information security of the organisation. 
4.1.4 Risk 4: Insecure Operational Behaviour 
Users engage in insecure behaviour while using BYODs allowing viruses and other malware infections 
to proliferate; exposing the organisation to information security incidents. (Gajar et al. 2013; Miller et 
al. 2012; Shumate and Ketel 2014; Wang et al. 2014). Malware is software created to disrupt the 
normal operation of other software, gather personal information, or access personal computer devices 
(Kramer and Bradfield 2010). In the same way that it impacts personal computers, malware is 
affecting mobile devices. Drew (2012) states that with the exponential growth of mobile devices in the 
last five years, malicious software targeting mobile devices has also been increasing. Indeed, according 
to Alcatel-Lucent’s report, 16 million mobile devices were infected with malware in 2014, representing 
a value 25% higher than in 2013 (Spencer 2015). Organisations must encourage the installation of 
anti-virus software on BYODs in order to prevent the proliferation of malware infection from BYODs.  
4.1.5 Risk 5: Unauthorised Access  
How users handle BYODs may allow unauthorised access to organisation information by third parties; 
exposing organisations to information security incidents (Wang et al. 2014). According to a survey 
conducted by Botdefender, 30% of BYOD users share their personal devices with relatives and friends, 
40% do not have a save screen mechanism, and only 9% employ a biometric authentication 
mechanism to secure access to the device (Donovan 2014). This research clearly shows that BYOD 
users do not realise the security risks that may arise from unauthorised access to their devices by third 
parties. Cappelli et al. (2012) suggest that the use of password-protected screen savers, along with 
good password practices (enforcing password robustness, changing passwords periodically etc.) is 
essential to decrease information security incidents. This reduces the likelihood of unauthorised users’ 
accessing sensitive information storage on devices and use of organisation applications.  
4.1.6 Risk 6: Exposure of Sensitive Organisational Data  
BYOD provides not only a wider range of endpoints where the employees can access organisational 
resources, but also allows distribution of sensitive information without authorisation, exposing data 
confidentiality (Miller et al. 2012). Once data is on a mobile device, control is difficult (Miller et al. 
2012). Sensitive information, such as customer data, is generally restricted to a few users in the 
organisation, however, with personal devices, that information can be easily copied (Wang et al. 2014). 
Potts (2012) maintains that employees sometimes intentionally bypass organisational security, when 
they need an electronic enterprise resource to complete a task. This action is considered to be non-
malicious misuse of organisational resources. Whilst normally the employee would not deliberately 
want to affect the information security of the organisation (Potts 2012), their actions could expose 
confidential organisational information (Wood 2013). For these reasons, organisations should 
establish the services and electronic resources that are allowed to access mobile devices (Miller et al. 
2012). The organisation must consider the BYOD risks and determine the services and application that 
will be accessible from personal devices such as e-mail, calendars, contacts and electronic documents. 
4.1.7 Risk 7: Lost BYOD Devices 
Wang et al. (2014) suggest that one of the primary concerns for organisations about BYOD devices is 
the likelihood that the device could be lost or stolen. Kaspersky (2013) found that one of every six 
users has suffered damage, loss, or theft of their mobile devices. Theft and loss of mobile devices 
exposes the confidentiality of organisational information (e.g. emails, business documents and 
financial information), in addition to personal information. According to Tu et al., (2015), even though 
the serious consequences may lead to compromising that information, this risk has not been addressed 
adequately. A single lost device can affect an organisations reputation and could compromise customer 
privacy (Tu et al. 2015). Ketel and Shumate (2015) suggest that organisations need to implement 
technology tools able to remotely wipe or lock devices to protect sensitive organisational information. 
4.1.8 Risk 8: Data Integrity Loss 
In the normal operation of personal devices, users may accidentally modify or eliminate sensitive 
organisational information (Dong et al. 2015; Miller et al. 2012). As users employ BYOD for both 
personal and business purposes, both environments need to coexist harmoniously in the same device 
without adversely affecting each other (Wang et al. 2014). Therefore, the security procedures to 
prevent the accidental modification or elimination of sensitive organisational information are 
required. For instance: to prohibit downloading of organisational information into personal devices; 
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backing up and performing changes of control of documents; or using a virtualisation technique to 
separate organisational space from personal space in personal devices (Vishal et al. 2013).  
4.2 BYOD Risks That Arise from Connectivity Procedures 
This section identifies and discusses 3 risks that arise from connectivity procedures. 
4.2.1 Risk 9: Exposure in Public Networks 
Employees want to remain connected with organisational electronic resources with their BYOD 
devices even outside the organisation. Usually such connections are made via public networks, such as 
Wi-Fi hotspots, which are usually free and are common in public places such as restaurants and 
airports making them extremely attractive for users. Goldsborough (2011) explains that the 
confidentiality and integrity of BYOD information is exposed when users employ Wi-Fi hotspots. 
Souppaya and Kent (2012) state that public Wi-Fi hotspots are susceptible to a man-in-the-middle 
attacks and eavesdropping, causing compromises in the integrity and confidentiality of information. 
organisations can mitigate this risk by connecting through public networks employing encryption of 
the communication with a virtual private network (VPN) (Ketel and Shumate 2015).  
4.2.2 Risk 10: Local Network Exposure 
Potts (2012) argues that insider threats emerge when an employee bypasses BYOD security controls 
through connecting to a local area network inside an organisation. Potts (2012) argues that insider 
attacks are difficult to prevent since they occur in the local area network (LAN) of the organisation 
using a valid user profile. Ketel and Shumate (2015) consider that organisations must establish 
security characteristics of mobile devices and devices that do not meet the security conditions should 
be denied access. Antivirus software, mobile operating systems, and security configuration settings are 
some of the mobile characteristics that organisations need to consider while granting access to their 
internal network (Ketel and Shumate 2015). Moreover, Verizon’s study suggests that organisations not 
only need to control employee-owned device access, but also review their users privileges to access 
sensitive data with their devices (Verizon 2014). 
4.2.3 Risk 11: Exposure in Personal Networks 
The information security of the organisation could be exposed when BYOD users connect their devices 
to a personal area network (Haataja 2008; Nasim 2012; Tan and Aguilar 2012). The most popular 
personal area network is one employing Bluetooth Technology (BT). BT is a wireless communication 
technology used within short ranges and is made of up to 7 devices acting as slaves (Nasim 2012). 
Podhradsky et al. (2012) claim that when a BT device is introduced as a business tool, it may be a 
threat not only to the user, but to the organisation as Bluetooth attacks can introduce security 
vulnerabilities into the business. These include eavesdropping, message modification and resource 
misappropriation (Podhradsky et al. 2012). Haataja (2008) and Podhradsky et al. (2012) suggest that 
the corporate information that is commonly compromised by Bluetooth attacks are: social security 
numbers, bank account information, business documents, contact information, and passwords. 
Podhradsky et al. (2012) suggest that the following security procedures may be adopted to reduce the 
likelihood of a Bluetooth incident: disable BT functionality if it is not used, change default device 
names, do not use the owner’s name as part of the device name, and change default pairing passkeys.  
4.3 BYOD Risks That Arise From Organisational Management Practices 
This section identifies and discusses 2 risks that arise from organisational management practices. 
4.3.1 Risk 12: BYOD Remote Management 
Vishal et al. (2013) suggest that organisations need to establish BYOD policies, and also need to ensure 
that employee-owned devices comply with these policies. They affirm that the challenge for 
organisations is to manage remotely both a large quantity and numerous models of personal devices 
(Vishal et al. 2013). Leavitt (2013) insists that organisations need a technological tool to ensure 
employees’ compliance with BYOD policies. Mobile Device Management (MDM) is a primary 
information security tool for organisations to manage employee-owned devices (Leavitt 2013). MDM 
permits organisations to monitor, manage, secure, and apply security policies on employee-owned 
mobile devices (Ketel and Shumate 2015). However, according to Schulze (2014), MDM alone does not 
provide sufficient security protection in a BYOD environment. MDM needs to be complemented with 
users’ authentication control like Network Access Control (NAC). NAC controls the users that are 
allowed to access what sort of data (Ketel and Shumate 2015). Employing MDM and NAC allows the 
following functionality: device enrolment into the network (e.g. connection, device registration, user 
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authentication), device security compliance (e.g. passcode, encryption), device operation (e.g. profile 
configuration, certificates, accounts) and monitoring (e.g. policies, alerts, rules). 
4.3.2 Risk 13: BYOD Training 
Users, without appropriate information security knowledge, may perform insecure behaviour and 
social learning may contribute to this insecure behaviour (Leavitt 2013). Tu et al. (2015) maintain that 
social learning, which includes family, friends, colleagues, or social media, plays a significant role in 
the mobile security environment. They criticise that social learning may generate information security 
incidents as often information security best practice is not learnt via a social means (Tu et al. 2015). 
There is also work around the concept of consequential ethics that may relate to BYOD training 
(Ruighaver et al. 2010). Shumate and Ketel (2014) insist that the organisations require not only a well-
defined set of BYOD guidelines, but they should also provide information security training sessions to 
their employees. Employees must know exactly what the organisation expects from them while they 
are working with their devices. The guidelines must include: safe device operation (e.g. establish lock 
codes or passcodes, avoid lending the device to third parties); networks allowed to access (e.g. hotspots 
are prohibited, a VPN connection needs to be established); measures to store organisational 
information (e.g. information must be encrypted, do not upload information to the cloud); and 
protocols to follow in case the device is lost or stolen (e.g. report immediately to the organisation). 
5 Results & Discussion 
In this section, the results of the analysis of the five BYOD policies are presented showing whether 
organisations have considered the risks identified (see table 1) in their BYOD policy. This section also 
discusses the findings obtained from the analysis of the five BYOD policy documents. In addition, a 
critical evaluation is included as a product of this assessment. 
The analysis compared each BYOD policy statement of the five organisations with the 13 risks detailed 
in Table 1. If one of the policy statements addresses one or more risks in Table 1, it was inferred that 
the organisation is acknowledging and is applying a mitigation strategy to mitigate that risk. In 
contrast, if none of the policy statements is addressing a specific risk in Table 1, it was inferred that the 
organisation is not acknowledging and therefore not applying a mitigation strategy to mitigate that 
risk. Table 2 presents a summary of the findings obtained in this research. The table identifies the risks 
that have been acknowledged and addressed by the organisations.  
Org1 – Non Profit Organisation, Org2 – Health Organisation, Org3 Educational Organisation, Org4 
Government Organisation, Org5 – Private Organisation. (Y – risk is addressed, N – risk is not addressed) 
BYOD perspective BYOD risks  Org1 Org2 Org3 Org4 Org5 
User behaviour 
Risk 1: BYOD Device Selection  Y Y Y Y Y 
Risk 2: BYOD Customisation  N Y Y Y Y 
Risk 3: Installation of Malicious Applications Y Y Y Y N 
Risk 4: Insecure Operational Behaviour Y Y Y Y Y 
Risk 5: Unauthorised Access  Y Y Y Y Y 
Risk 6: Exposure of Sensitive Organisational Data  Y Y N Y Y 
Risk 7: Lost BYOD Devices Y Y Y Y Y 
Risk 8: Data Integrity Loss N N Y Y Y 
Connectivity 
procedures 
Risk 9: Exposure in Public Networks  N Y Y Y N 
Risk 10: Local Network Exposure  Y Y N N Y 
Risk 11: Exposure in Personal Networks  N N Y N N 
Management 
practices 
Risk 12: BYOD Remote Management  Y Y N Y Y 
Risk 13: BYOD Training  N Y N N N 
Table 2: Summary of BYOD policies analysis associated with allowing BYOD into 
organisations 
5.1 Risk 1: BYOD Device Selection  
Different BYOD platforms have unique security weaknesses that may trigger information security 
incidents while accessing sensitive organisational information. Thus, it is not surprising that all the 
organisations evaluated in this research have identified and limited the platforms that will be 
permitted to access organisational information. Indeed, some of them have defined the platform, the 
model and the version of the operating systems that will be included in the BYOD program. The more 
specific the models are in the policies; the better the control organisations can exert on those devices. 
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5.2 Risk 2: BYOD Customisation 
The BYOD statements to prohibit the use of use of “jailbreaking” and “root” devices to access 
organisational information are consistent with that suggested by Kang et al. (2015). Organisations in 
this research have recognised that those types of devices tend to be more vulnerable to viruses and 
insecure applications, which may expose the organisation to information security incidents. However, 
none of the five organisations have considered “unlocked” devices. In the same way that “jailbreaking” 
and “root” devices are a threat to the information security of the organisation, “unlocked” devices do 
not have the security controls that prevent access to information by insecure applications. Therefore, 
organisations should also exclude “unlocked” devices to access organisational information.  
5.3 Risk 3: Installation of Malicious Applications 
Shumate and Ketel (2014) acknowledge that malicious applications installed on BYODs can 
compromise organisational information. In the same way, most of the organisations in this research 
have recognised this risk. They attempt to guide users to the applications that should be installed on 
their personal device. Most organisations address this risk with policy statements that recommend 
downloading applications from reputable sources only. Nevertheless, it is unclear how organisations 
will enforce this policy. An alternative solution to monitor applications on personal devices is to install 
MDM agent on personal devices. MDM agent, along with MDM software, is an automatic and efficient 
way to monitor the installation of approved applications into personal devices.  
5.4 Risk 4: Insecure Operational Behaviour 
Ketel and Shumate (2015) have drawn attention to the fact that malware can generate a cyber-attack in 
organisations. Similarly, all the organisations in this study are aware of the information security 
threats that may trigger the proliferation of malware in BYODs. Identified policy statements claim to 
use anti-virus software on personal devices. Furthermore, in order to strengthen this policy, 
organisations should be encouraged to install anti-virus software on personal devices, but also provide 
licenses to users for free. They can motivate users willing to install anti-virus software on their devices 
because this statement will protect both organisational and personal information.  
5.5 Risk 5: Unauthorised Access  
In alignment with Cappelli et al. (2012)’s recommendations to install password-protected screen 
savers on personal devices, the five organisational BYOD policies support using an authentication 
mechanism to secure access to the device. Additionally, organisations can strengthen the 
authentication mechanism with MDM functionality. To illustrate, one BYOD policy analysed (from a 
government organisation) mandates an e-mail wipe on the device after several failed password 
attempts. Organisations that implement this technique will strength the confidentiality protection of 
the information that is storage into personal devices.  
5.6 Risk 6: Exposure of Sensitive Organisational Data  
The predisposition to protect sensitive information storage on personal devices of four organisations in 
this research agrees with Miller et al. (2012)’s suggestion to define the services and applications that 
will be accessible from personal devices. Some of the organisations have defined e-mail, office calendar 
and contact list as services appropriate to be accessed from personal devices. However, these 
organisations have not mentioned in the policies how they are going to protect the access to non-
authorised services and applications from BYODs. 
5.7 Risk 7: Lost BYODs 
As specified by Wang et al. (2014), most of the organisations attempted to protect themselves from the 
loss of personal devices. Consequently, almost all the organisations evaluated in this research have 
implemented a mobile device management solution to wipe organisational information from a BYOD 
remotely. Organisations should make it clear however in policy whether this functionality will wipe 
only organisational information or the whole information storage including personal information.  
5.8 Risk 8: Data integrity Loss 
Wang et al. (2014) suggest that users may accidentally eliminate sensitive organisational information 
in personal devices. Three of the five organisations evaluated have recognised this risk prohibiting the 
storage of organisational information only in BYOD devices. However, none of the five organisations 
have considered employing virtualisation techniques to separate organisational space from personal 
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space in BYOD devices. This method can provide an alternative solution to manage both personal and 
business information in the same device without it affecting each other.  
5.9 Risk 9: Internal Network Exposure 
Only two BYOD policies mandated VPN use while connecting to public networks from BYOD devices. 
These policy statements align with the recommendations of Ketel and Shumate (2015) to protect 
organisational integrity and confidentiality of the information. However, one of these two 
organisations have adopted a risky strategy to allow employees to “make a risk-conscious decision” 
before connecting to a public network without VPN usage. Such procedures may compromise the 
security of the information because end-users may not have adequate knowledge to define whether a 
network is secure. 
5.10 Risk 10: Internal Network Exposure 
Ketel and Shumate (2015) recommendations to protect the security the information from insider 
attacks from personal devices. These recommendations support the BYOD statements that encourage 
the installation of MDM agents in personal devices was taken by two organisations in this research. A 
MDM agent along with management software will control security configuration settings in personal 
devices such as configuration settings, software customisation, and malware. However, in order to 
reduce the probability of an insider attack is required to integrate the MDM with NAC solution to grant 
user access to personal devices to the local area network.  
5.11 Risk 11: Exposure in Personal Networks 
Only one of the five organisations has mitigated the risks that are associated with personal area 
network attacks. In alignment with Podhradsky et al. (2012)’s proposal, this policy statement 
recommends disabling the Bluetooth service while is not in use. Literature review recognises the high 
impact of this risk to the information security of the organisation. However, while developing this 
research, it was not found statistics regarding personal area network attacks. The lack of awareness in 
BYOD policies of this risk may be the result of its low occurrence probability. 
5.12 Risk 12: BYOD Remote Management 
Leavitt (2013) states that in order to preserve information security in organisations, it is necessary to 
remotely manage and control users’ compliance with BYOD policies. Four of the organisations studied 
addressed this risk, and have implemented an MDM solution before granting access to sensitive 
information. It was expected that organisations would implement a technical solution to help to 
efficiently manage and control the large number and type of BYOD devices employed in the workplace.  
5.13 Risk 13: BYOD Training 
Only one of the five organisations in their policy statements has addressed the risk related to insecure 
behaviour while allowing BYOD into organisations as was recommended by Tu et al. (2015). The scope 
of BYOD policies is often limited to describing guidelines to mitigate information security risks. 
Therefore, it cannot be concluded that organisations have not considered this risk because it may be 
included in another document like IS strategic plan report of the organisation. 
6 Conclusion 
This study set out to answer the research question “How comprehensively are BYOD information 
security risks addressed in BYOD policy”? 13 BYOD specific risks were identified from the literature 
that were subsequently used to assess 5 organisation’s BYOD policies. This study identifies that first, 
organisations are aware of the risks related to “User Behaviour” and its procedures to mitigate these 
risks. Also, organisations recognise that information security tools are necessary to mitigate BYOD 
risks (e.g. anti-virus software, authentication mechanisms, MDM software monitor, and document 
encryption). Second, the study results indicate that there is a weakness in mitigating the risks 
associated with “Connectivity Procedures”. Some organisation’s policies do not recognise the 
information security incidents that may originate from an insecure connection to both a public and 
personal area network. Third, regarding “Management Practices”, the research suggests that 
organisations are relying on MDM as the main technological tool to monitor users’ devices that are 
accessing organisational information.  
Additionally, because of the limitations of this research it cannot be concluded whether organisations 
are considering the importance to provide training sessions to BYOD users. The content and the BYOD 
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risks described in this paper are solely based on the existing literature. BYOD is a fairly new research 
topic in the IS community (although there is some work on privacy – see (Carron et al. 2016)), so it 
was necessary to build a BYOD risks list to evaluate information security strategies of organisations 
with regard to BYOD. BYOD policies were used to evaluate organisational strategies, but it would have 
been more valuable to assess BYOD policies along with IS strategic plans and interviews with IS 
leaders. This presents a unique opportunity for future research.  
The findings of this research imply that organisations are addressing the risks associated with users 
BYOD use with appropriate information security tools. However, they need to improve the information 
security best practices related to connectivity procedures. Organisations need to be aware of the 
information security incidents that may generate while connecting to different networks.  
With the comprehensive list of BYOD and the findings of this research, organisations can build better 
information security procedures to manage information security risks associated with allowing BYOD 
in the workplace. They can use this information along with their organisational structures, procedures, 
processes and technology to build not only better BYOD policies, but also more efficient information 
security procedures. These procedures must adjust to the organisational reality and business goals in 
order to be practical for the organisation. 
In this research, BYOD policies were evaluated against a comprehensive list of security risks associated 
with allowing BYOD into organisations. The evaluation was designed to identify statements in BYOD 
policies that mitigate information security risks in organisations. A further comparative study can be 
undertaken to identify the most effective strategy to address the same risk. This study must also 
consider the fact that the different organisations have unique information security priorities, as it 
depends heavily on the business goals of the organisation. Therefore, this future study must be focused 
to evaluate security strategies to mitigate information security risks from a specific industry sector.  
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